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District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago made
history central to the future of Second Amendment adjudication.1 In
NYSRPA v. Bruen, the Supreme Court will have to decide how to evaluate
conflicting accounts of the history of gun regulation in America.2 The Court
* Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University. I would like to thank
Katrina Uyehara, Lisa Tu, and Peter C. Angelica for research assistance and help with creating the
maps and tables for this article. A group of intrepid and eternally patient Second Amendment
scholars provided an invaluable sounding board for many of the ideas discussed in this essay. I
would like to thank Eric Ruben, Joseph Blocher, Jake Charles, and Darrell A.H. Miller, for their
insights and their exemplary work on this contentious topic. In a field often marked by rancor they
have set a high scholarly bar and remain models of intellectual integrity and collegiality.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591, 595 (2008); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 68 (2010).
2. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-843.html
[https://perma.cc/5DQT-ZLUY].
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must distinguish between pseudo-historical arguments that are part of an
invented historical tradition, one that can be directly traced to modern gun
rights activism, and the actual history of gun regulation, a tradition that
extends over more than four centuries of English and American legal
history.3 Much of this regulatory tradition was not available to either the
Heller or McDonald court because the new materials were identified and
collected in the decade after the Court issued its two landmark rulings.4 This
essay analyzes a number of the most egregious historical errors presented to
the Court and summarizes some of the findings of the new historical
scholarship.
In contrast to the first generation of scholarship on the Second
Amendment that informed much of the opinion in Heller, a more recent body
of research takes up Heller and McDonald
history of gun regulation.5 This second generation of Second Amendment
scholarship relies on powerful new digital searching techniques and virtual
archives of primary sources unavailable at the time the two decisions were
rendered.6 This newly unearthed history has now been scrupulously
documented by historians on both sides of the Atlantic: it shows a long
tradition of arms regulation in public, extending over six centuries.7 In
particular, the new evidence links the good cause permit scheme at issue in
NYSRPA v. Bruen to constitutional developments and legislation enacted
during the era of the Fourteenth Amendment, a fact that should render New
York law presumptively lawful under the Heller/ McDonald history, text,
neither anomalous, nor seen as unduly burdensome for the generation that
enacted the Fourteenth Amendment, many of the briefs submitted to the
court and the claims presented by Paul Clement during oral argument rest on

3. Compare Brief for Second Amendment Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 20, 2021) with Brief
of Professors of History and Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, N.Y. State Rifle &
Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 21, 2021).
4. Eric M. Ruben & Darrell A. H. Miller, Preface: The Second Generation of Second
Amendment Law & Policy, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2017).
5. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald, 561 U.S. 742.
6. Ruben & Miller, supra note 4. For a good illustration of the significant expansion in the
range of sources now available, compare the breadth of sources available using microfilms
materials consulted by Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487 (2004) with the expanded number of
sources available using digital materials and search techniques in Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law
History in the United States and Second Amendment Rights, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2017).
7. See generally the essays collected in A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?: THE CONTESTED ROLE
OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT (Jennifer Tucker et al.
eds., 2019) and the materials presented in the amicus brief by Brief of Professors of History and
Law, supra note 3.

June 2022

HISTORY AND TRADITION OR FANTASY AND F ICTION

147

demonstrably false historical claims.8 Even more puzzling, many of the
positions advanced during oral argument in Bruen suggest that a majority of
the Court is considering striking down the New York law, not because it fails
the text, history, and tradition test, but because it does not fit the modern
expansive vision of gun rights that animates the Republican Party and the
Federalist Society.9 It would be difficult to overstate the significance of
Bruen to the future of the contentious debate over gun regulation. Moreover,
the case offers proponents of originalism a rare opportunity to demonstrate
that their method is not an ideological smoke screen for results-oriented
jurisprudence, but a rigorous and neutral judicial philosophy.
oriented law office history, recent gun rights scholarship has carried forward
this earlier flawed approach, enhancing it with power of digital searching
and an infusion of nearly limitless research support by the NRA and other
right-wing sources of funding.10 This body of
remains highly selective in both its use of primary and secondary sources
and continues to be marred by serious anachronisms and methodological
problems.11
past was evident in the oral argument in Bruen. Indeed, Justice Breyer
castigated the gun rights version of the past as little more than law office

8. See discussion infra pp. 4 31.
9. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). The Federalist Society has consistently endorsed a strongly libertarian
reading of the Second Amendment, and for a good illustration of this approach, see The Second
Amendment and the New Supreme Court, Federalist Society 2019, 43 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol y,
219 346 (2020).
10. Will Van Sant, The NRA Paid a Gun Rights Activist to File SCOTUS Briefs. He Didn t
Disclose it to the Court, THE TRACE (Nov. 3, 2021). For a general discussion of the rise of
coordinated and funded amicus campaigns, see Sheldon Whitehouse, A Flood of Judicial Lobbying:
Amicus Influence and Funding Transparency, 131 YALE. L.J.F. 141 (2021). See in particular,
Amicus Brief for Second Amendment Law Professors, supra note 3; Brief for Professors Robert
Leider and Nelson Lund, and the Buckeye Firearms Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 20, 2021); Brief for
Mountain States Legal Foundation s Center to Keep and Bear Arms as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 16, 2021).
11. On historical methodology, see generally MARTHA HOWELL & WALTER PREVENIER,
FROM RELIABLE SOURCES: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL METHODS (Cornell University
Press ed., 2001). On the methods of professional legal history, see THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LEGAL HISTORY (Markus Dirk Dubber & Christopher L. Tomlins eds., 2018). In contrast to the
work of discredited work of historian Michael Bellesiles, gun rights scholarship continues to be
churned out with little regard to scholarly norms, see Saul Cornell, Half Cocked : The Persistence
of Anachronism and Presentism in the Academic Debate Over the Second Amendment, 106 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 203 (2016). For a short and thoughtful overview of the Bellesiles scandal, see
David J. Garrow, Review: Crimes of History, 29 The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 112 (2005).
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history.12 Although numerous scholars have derided Heller as a particularly
egregious example of law office history, it is unusual that a sitting justice
would make this type of charge in oral argument. Justice Sotomayor was
even less charitable in her assessment of the arguments being presented to
the Court by gun rights attorney Paul Clement, suggesting that he was
making up the history out of thin air.13 Again, similar claims have been made
jurisprudence, but it is striking to see such trenchant statements in oral
argument.14
Although clashing views of history have often been presented to the
essentially made up, literally unanchored from reality, or at least any reality
that a serious historian would recognize as a plausible account of the past, is
15
unprecedent
The level of ideological distortion
evident in both the briefing and oral argument in Bruen may do what a
generation of academic scholarship could not do: thoroughly discredit the
claims that originalism is a genuinely neutral and rigorous scholarly
methodology.16
The historical evidence presented to the Court shows
law is not only long-standing, but some of the material is hundreds of years
and
tradition is virtually unassailable.17 Arms have been regulated in populace
areas for centuries under Anglo-American law.18
in Bruen itself derives from permit schemes enacted during the
Reconstruction Era, placing them firmly in the period of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a fact that makes them presumptively lawful under Heller and

12. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n, No. 20-843 (U.S.
Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/20843_8n5a.pdf.
13. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 19.
14. See generally, Patrick J. Charles, The Invention of the Right to Peaceable Carry in
Modern Second Amendment Scholarship, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 195.
15. On the use and abuse of history by the Supreme Court, that introduced the concept of law
office history, see Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
119, 122 n.13 (1965). As the Ninth Circuit recently counseled in Young v. Hawaii, courts must
proceed carefully when tackling complex historical questions, particularly those that span across
more than five hundred years, lest they fall into the trap of law office history. Young v. Hawaii,
992 F.3d 765, 785 86 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 11, 2021) (No.
20-843). Avoiding the trap of law office history requires a sophisticated approach to the
historical record and the relevant legal sources.
16. Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional Originalism and History, PROCESS: A BLOG FOR
AMERICAN HISTORY (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history.
17. Spitzer, supra note 6.
18. Id.
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framework.19
of laws as Paul Clement argued: millions of Americans were living under
some form of good cause permit scheme by the end of the nineteenth century.
Finally, states and localities enforced these and other gun laws in a racially
neutral manner until the rise of Jim Crow ushered in an era of white
supremacy-motivated prosecutions.20 Gun control, it turns out, was not
inherently racist, nor was it antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment; it was
an indispensable part of the government framework adopted by Republicans
to implement their vision of equality and rights at the core of the
Amendment.21
Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett, face a particularly difficult challenge
reconciling their professed commitment to this theory with a decision
striking the law down. Both jurists have strenuously insisted that originalism
is a neutral methodology that follows the historical evidence even if the
outcomes are not congenial to their policy preferences or those of the
22
Given that ample evidence was presented in the
briefs filed in support of New York that stringent regulation of guns in
populace areas is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law, it is odd that neither

19. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald, 561 U.S. 742, 767 68 (2010); JOSEPH BLOCHER &
DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE
FUTURE OF HELLER (Cambridge University Press ed., 2018).
20. By the end of the nineteenth century more than half the population of California were
living under some type of restrictive public carry legal regime, see Saul Cornell, The Right to
Regulate Arms in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Emergence of Good Cause Permit
Schemes in Post-Civil War America, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 65, 84 85 (2021). On the
racially neutral character of enforcement during Reconstruction and the rise of discriminatory
enforcement during Jim Crow, see Brennan Gardner Rivas, 55 Enforcement of Public Carry
Restrictions: Texas as a Case Study 2603, 2607 08, 2616 17, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (2022)
(manuscript at 5 6, 10 12), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3941466.
21. For a sampling of ideologically slanted scholarship on this topic, see generally STEPHEN
P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS,
1866-1876 (1998); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Never Intended to Be Applied to the
White Population: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity The Redeemed South s Legacy to
a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1310, 1318 (1995); NICHOLAS JOHNSON,
NEGROES AND THE GUN: THE BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS (Prometheus, 1st ed. 2014); Clayton
E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 17, 18 (1994). For its
strategic deployment in Bruen, see Brief for Petitioners at 2, 10 13, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n
v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 13, 2021); Brief for National African American Gun Ass n, Inc. in
Support of Petitioners at 2 11, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July
16, 2021), [hereinafter Amicus Brief for NAAGA]. For a critique of this argument, see Mark A.
Frassetto, The Nonracist and Antiracist History of Firearms Public Carry Regulation, 74 SMU L.
REV. F. 169 (2021).
22. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
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justice devoted much time in oral argument to discussing this body of
evidence, a striking omission given their originalist commitments. 23
Solicitor General if she thought Heller was correctly decided,24 but the
question would have been more appropriately addressed to Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh. Both justices expressed discomfort with
treating the Second Amendment differently than the way modern courts treat
other rights, an odd concern given the originalist framework dictated by
Heller and McDonald. The proper question should have been: how did
Americans in the Founding generation and the era of the Fourteenth
Amendment understand the scope of permissible gun regulation?
Even if one jettisoned the history, text, and tradition framework, the
characterization of rights by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh
was incorrect as a matter of existing federal jurisprudence.25 There is no
single model for adjudicating rights claims in current constitutional
jurisprudence.26 Even if one restricts the scope of inquiry to the First
Amendment, a constitutional analogy favored by gun rights advocates that
rests on a weak foundation, there is no single standard for this area of the
law: there are multiple tests for constitutionality depending on the type of
speech being regulated.27 Although core political speech triggers strict
scrutiny, other types of speech are subjected to more deferential tests, and
some types of speech enjoy no First Amendment protections.28 In short there

23. See Amicus Brief for Professors of History and Law, supra note 3; see also, Brief for
Patrick J. Charles as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n v.
Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. July 19, 2021).
24. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 90.
25. On the problematic analogies between the First and Second Amendment, see Gregory P.
Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91
TEX. L. REV. 49, 99 (2012); Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 621 682 (2019).
26. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 50 (Justice Kavanaugh addressing Paul
Clement, . . I want to make sure I understand your main problem here with this permitting regime
. . . that s just not how we do constitutional rights, where we allow blanket discretion to grant or
deny something for all sorts of reasons ). Id. at 94 6 (Chief Justice Roberts addressing Brian H.
Fletcher for the United States and drawing comparisons to the First Amendment and other
provisions of the Constitution). In fact, rights, including rights expressly protected by the first eight
amendments, are not treated in a uniform manner in existing jurisprudence. See also Joseph
Blocher, Disuniformity of Federal Constitutional Rights, U. OF ILL. L. REV. 1479, 1485, 1499
(2020).
27. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944
46 (Foundation Press, 19th ed. 2016) (analyzing the different categories of speech and relevant tests
for constitutionality).
28. For a good summary of types of speech excluded from First Amendment protection, see
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). In particular, incitement, fighting words,
true threats, and incitement to criminal conduct are all excluded and thus if one made the error of
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are multiple standards of review in existing First Amendment doctrine.29
Moreover, few other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are given the same
level of protection as core political speech.30 More germane to
originalist framework, guns have never been regulated in a manner
analogous to words at any time in the long arc of American legal history.
Firearms have always been subject to a variety of prior restraints that would
never have been permissible in the case of core political speech.31

I. Property Law and Criminal Law: Missing Originalist Contexts
for Implementing Heller and McDonald
Scholarship on the Second Amendment has generally proceeded with
little concern for how the history of other fields within American law
illuminate the way guns have been treated by states and localities, where the
bulk of gun regulation occurred before the 20th century.32 In particular, the
history of property and criminal law are indispensable to understanding how
the regulation of guns and self-defense has evolved under American law in
the period after the adoption of the Second Amendment.
As a historical matter, the proper analogy to gun regulation has never
been words but has always been property.33 Between the adoption of the
treating guns and words as constitutionally similar, the display of a firearm would place among
those types of speech outside of the First Amendment.
29. MICHAEL C. DORF & TREVOR MORRISON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159 (Oxford
University Press, 1st ed. 2010).
30. On the problematic analogies between the First and Second Amendment, see Gregory P.
Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91
TEX. L. REV. 49, 99 (2012); Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 621 682 (2019).
31. Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory,
16 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 988 (1999). The example of loyalty oaths illustrates this
point. Many states required loyalty oaths and disarmed those who refused to swear or affirm the
oath. No state required similar oaths to exercise core First Amendment-type freedoms. Nor can
loyalty oaths be understood as imposing a dangerousness exemption given that one of the groups
disarmed was the Quakers who were pacifists and among the most peaceful and law-abiding
communities in early America, a fact that undercuts the interpretation of this evidence offered by
Justice Amy Coney Barrett in Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 454 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of how Quaker disarmament confounds the simple individual rightscollective rights categorization that has defined much recent Second Amendment scholarship and
jurisprudence, see Saul Cornell, Conflict, Consensus & Constitutional Meaning: The Enduring
Legacy of Charles Beard 29 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 383, 299 401 (2014).
32. Spitzer, supra note 6.
33. Founding era lawyers and judges approach rights from a paradigm that treated them as
property. Thinking of rights in these terms meant that rights were not exempt from reasonable
regulation provided the statutes were enacted by representatives of the people acting to further the
common good and not any special or partial interest, see John Phillip Reid, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 96 113 (University of
Wisconsin Press ed., 1987). Understanding eighteenth-century conceptions of rights requires
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Second Amendment and enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, guns
were extensively regulated, and the framework governing them was derived
from property law. In fact, the scope of gun regulation intensified after the
adoption of the Second Amendment and increased after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Reconstruction witnessed an enormous expansion
of gun regulation at both the state and local level.34
If one looks closely at Founding era conception of rights, the case for
treating guns as a form of property is even stronger. The concept of
inalienable right, including self-defense, was expressly listed as part of the
Lockean trinity of life, liberty, and property in the first state constitutions.35
The term inalienable itself derives from English property law. The notion
that because the right to acquire property was inalienable, government was
prohibited from regulating it in a manner consistent with police power
authority has no foundation in Anglo-American jurisprudence.36 Indeed,
such an idea would have been almost incomprehensible to the Founding
generation. Property has always been subject to a host of regulations.37 Just
because you owned a tannery, did not mean you got to dump lye into the
stream a mile from your neighbor.38 The same legal principle has always
applied to guns.
All guns were not created equal in the eyes of the law during the
Founding era.39 Only a narrow subset of firearms suitable for participation
in the militia were given the highest level of constitutional protection. One
setting aside many modern legal ideas about rights and recovering the lost language of Founding
era rights talk ; see Jonathan Gienapp, Response: The Foreign Founding: Rights, Fixity, and the
Original Constitution, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 115 (2019); Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and
the Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 569 (2017).
34. Delaware s provision was typical of militia laws from the Founding era and extended
additional constitutional protections for militia weapons, making them immune from seizure in debt
proceedings or confiscation for failure to pay taxes, see Chapter 36, sec. 42 LAWS OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE (1793). All other weapons were subject to the full range of state police power
regulation and civil suits. In essence, militia weapons, were a form of taxation, transferring part of
the cost of public defense to individual households. For an exploration of the tax analogy in a
modern context, see Hannah E. Shearer & Allison S. Anderman, Analyzing Gun-ViolencePrevention Taxes Under Emerging Firearm Fee Jurisprudence, 43 S. ILL. U. L. J. 157 (2018).
35. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
367 (1991).
36. See generally Joseph Postell, Regulation during the American Founding: Achieving Liberalism
and Republicanism, 5 AMERICAN POL. THOUGHT 80 (2016).
37. See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (The University of North Carolina Press, 1st ed. 1996).
38. Id. at 218, 227.
39. On the important distinction between arms suitable for the militia and the ordinary arms
most popular with Americans at the time of the Second Amendment, see generally Kevin M.
Sweeney, Firearms Ownership and Militias in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century England and
America, in A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?: THE CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT (Jennifer Tucker et al. eds., 2019).
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of the most fundamental principles in Founding era constitutional law was
the rule against taking property without just compensation. Interestingly,
some guns were expressly exempted from this rule. Pennsylvania, the first
state to recognize the right to bear arms, excluded the requirement to
purchase arms and ammunition from the Takings Principle governing nearly
all private property. Modern scholarly and judicial treatments of the right to
bear arms in the Pennsylvania Constitution typically focus exclusively on
Article XIII affirming the right to bear arms. But this provision was the not
the first discussion of arms bearing in the state Constitution. The first
mention of this right occurred in the context of the Takings Principle and the
right of conscientious objectors:
That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expence [sic] of that
protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an
taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own
consent, or that of his legal representatives: Nor can any man who
is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly
compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent, nor are the
people bound by any laws, but such as they have in like manner
assented to, for their common good.40

Government could not take property without compensation, but a subset
of firearms were exempt from this rule. The state could require individuals
to purchase firearms and use their own ammunition without any
compensation. Many of the individual state militia laws also went further
and exempted militia weapons from seizure during debt proceedings or sale
for payment of tax arrears. All other firearms were treated as ordinary
debate over firearms has operated with a simplistic dichotomy totally alien
to the Founding generation.
words and entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection or they
viewed as entirely outside the scope of constitutional protection. The
Founding era approached this issue in more nuanced fashion. Some guns
enjoyed protections denied to virtually any other form of property, and other
guns were treated in the same way as ordinary property. The modern
dichotomy that suggests that guns must be treated like words, or they are
entirely outside of constitutional protection is deeply flawed and would have
puzzled members of the Founding generation.

40. P.A. CONST. art. VIII (1776).
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The principle that not all guns were created equal did not disappear from
American law after the Founding era. Several states and localities, passed
laws that taxed some weapons, typically pistols, but exempted those firearms
41
There was also taxes on firing
ranges. Directly taxing guns or imposing incidental taxes on their use posed
no constitutional issues for Americans in the pre-Civil War era. The trend
not only continued after the Civil War, but as was true for nearly every aspect
of firearms law, the level of regulation intensified. States and localities taxed
pistols during Reconstruction.42 Alabama imposed the following tax on
handguns:
All pistols or revolvers in the possession of private persons not
regular dealers holding them for sale, a tax of two dollars each;
and on all bowie knives, or knives of the like description, held by
persons not regular dealers, as aforesaid, a tax of three dollars
each; and such tax must be collected by the assessor when
assessing the same, on which a special receipt shall be given to
the tax payer therefor, showing that such tax has been paid for
the year, and in default of such payment when demanded by the
assessor, such pistols, revolvers, bowie knives, or knives of like
description, must be seized by him, and unless redeemed by
payment in ten days.

The implication of treating firearms as property, a tradition that extends
to the origins of the nation, needs further scholarly attention. The historical
evidence that guns have never been treated in the same fashion as words is
also overwhelming. Given these facts, the discomfort expressed by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh about how New Yor
the right to bear arms in an anomalous fashion is both historically inaccurate
and misrepresents the current state of constitutional jurisprudence. The
discomfort
that has been in place for over a century; the tension is a function Heller
originalism.
Few rights enshrined in the bill of rights are treated in the narrow and
circumscribed fashion that the Founding generation approached rights.43
41. ANDERSON HUTCHINSON, CODE OF MISSISSIPPI: BEING AN ANALYTICAL COMPILATION
OF THE PUBLIC AND GENERAL STATUTES OF THE TERRITORY AND STATE, WITH TABULAR
REFERENCES TO THE LOCAL AND PRIVATE ACTS, FROM 1798 TO 1848: WITH THE NATIONAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, CESSIONS OF THE COUNTRY BY THE CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW
INDIANS, AND ACTS OF CONGRESS FOR THE SURVEY AND S ALE OF THE L ANDS, AND GRANTING
DONATIONS THEREOF TO THE STATE 182 (1848).
42. THE REVISED CODE OF ALABAMA, 169 (1867). See also 1867 MISS. LAWS 327 28, An
Act To Tax Guns And Pistols In The County Of Washington, ch. 249, § 1.
43. For a good illustration of this, see generally Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First
Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 312 (2017).
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rst Amendment accords protections largely un-dreamed
of in the Founding era, it is hardly surprising that Second Amendment
jurisprudence, still in its infancy, has not had time to expand the scope of the
right to bear arms to bring it into conformity with other aspects of the modern
rights revolution. Most other areas of constitutional law have not been
shaped by originalism, but some form of living constitutionalism. 44 What
Roberts and Kavanaugh appear to be gesturing toward is a repudiation of
Heller originalism and an application of living constitutionalism to the
Second Amendment. Unfortunately, neither jurist articulated this desire in a
transparent manner in oral argument.45
Given that Heller tied the Second Amendment to individual selfdefense, one would think that the oral argument in Bruen would have
devoted greater attention to charting the evolving understanding of this right
under Anglo-American law, but sadly this issue did not receive much
attention, despite a remarkable brief filed by two
scholars on the history of criminal law, George Fletcher and Guyora
Binder.46 Yet, an understanding of the history of criminal law is
defense. Although Federalists and Anti-Federalists were divided on many
issues, there was little disagreement between the two sides in ratification that
ability to define the scope of self-defense by local statute. Federalist Tench
Coxe and the Anti-Federalist author Brutus may have agreed on few
things, but they were in accord on this point. Brutus made this point
to be left to the state governments to
provide for the protection and defence of the citizen against the hand of
private violence, and the wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each
other . . . . 47 Federalist Tench Coxe, echoed this sentiment, declaring
confidently that
states will regulate and administer the criminal law,
48
exclusively of
point that there has never been a single uniform standard of self-defense
across all American jurisdictions, a basic fact about criminal law, that seems
44. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1234 (2015) (arguing
Constitutional law is, after all, replete with instances of non-originalist construction. ).
45. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 24 27, 52 53.
46. Brief for Criminal Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, N.Y. State
Rifle & Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, (2021) (No. 20-843).
47. BRUTUS, ESSAYS OF BRUTUS VII, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 358,
400 05 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
48. TENCH COXE & A. FREEMAN, FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION : WRITINGS OF THE
THER FEDERALISTS, 1787-1788 82 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., Liberty
Fund 1998).
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to have escaped the notice of the Supreme Court in its oral argument in
Bruen.49
Under English common law, the use of deadly force was permitted in
the home but strictly limited outside of the home. 50 So, from its very
inception, the right of self-defense in the Anglo-American tradition was
related to time and space in a unique way that set it apart from other rights.
Outside of the home, one had a duty to retreat, not stand your ground under
common law if one faced a threat. The strength of the right diminished as
one moved further away from the home and moved into more populous
areas. Additionally, the limits on deadly force were also different if one
encountered a home intrusion during the day and if one did so at night.51
Thus, the right of self-defense existed in constitutional space and time in a
way that made it different than other rights. Consequently, the scope of the
right of self-defense was fundamentally shaped by where and when the right
was exercised.
The ancient Statute of Northampton (1328), a law that was extensively
discussed in the Bruen oral argument,52 singled out sensitive places such as
courts and populous areas such as fairs and markets as locations where one
could not travel armed unless one was acting to preserve the peace. Several
justices seemed to confuse these two distinct features of the Statute of
Northampton thereby eliding the difference between populous areas and
historically sensitive ones. A federal courthouse is a sensitive place;
Grand Central Station is a populous one. This important distinction is
supported by a host of specific, contemporaneous statutes that existed
alongside Northampton-type laws and separately addressed the use of
firearms during sensitive times, including

49. Mark Anthony Frassetto, Meritless Historical Arguments in Second Amendment
Litigation, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 531 (2019).
50. Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, What Is Criminal Law About?, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1173, 1183 (2016); Daryl A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2017).
51. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 72 76 (1716). John
Adams used Hawkins extensively in preparing for the Boston Massacre trial, see ADAMS PAPERS,
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, CASES 63 AND 64: THE BOSTON MASSACRE TRIALS 242 270 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965).
52. STATUTE OF NORTHAMPTON 2 EDW. 3, C. 3 (1328), (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds.,
The
Founders
Const.
1986),
https://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs1.html. On the importance of the Statute of
Northampton to maintain the peace, see generally A. J. Musson, Sub-Keepers and Constables: The
Role of Local Officials in Keeping the Peace in Fourteenth-Century England, 117 ENG. HIST. REV.
1 (2002). Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 48 49, 57 58, 90 91, 93 94.
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Day.53 Although some populous places may also be sensitive places, and
vice versa, the two concepts should not be conflated.
The Statute of Northampton and its American analogs were not just
regulations of sensitive places or times. These types of laws prohibited arms
from places of commerce and civic life because 18th- and 19th- century
Americans believed that the presence of arms undermined civil society,
public peace, and freedom itself.54 Fairs and markets were, at that time, the
centers of commerce, civic life, and culture. They were typically the location
for the placement of important public announcements facts which mark
55

II.
One of the oddest arguments presented by Clement drew on a claim
made in an amicus brief by Second Amendment law professors that noted
the unremarkable fact that many in the Founding era carried guns in public.
reveals a lack
of understanding about the social and cultural history of eighteenth-century
America.56 Thus, Clement and the pro-gun professors note that Patrick
Henry often traveled to court with a musket. What Clement and the pro-gun
briefs ignore is that court days were among the most important public
occasions in rural Virginia. These events were one of the few times when
members of the community, typically scattered across the rural landscape of
Virginia, gathered together; it was only natural that these occasions would
be a convenient time to gather the militia together for muster, inspection, and
training.57 So rather than provide evidence for a broad free-standing right to
travel armed in public, the Henry example merely shows that when traveling
to militia muster, Henry carried the weapon that Virginia law compelled him
53. 1665 N.Y. Laws 205, Ordinance Of The Director General And Council Of New Netherland
To Prevent Firing Of Guns, Planting May Poles And Other Irregularities Within This Province,
DUKE
CENTER
FOR
FIREARMS
LAW
(last
visited
May
26,
2022),
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1665-n-y-laws-205-ordinance-of-the-director-general-andcouncil-of-new-netherland-to-prevent-firing-of-guns-planting-may-poles-and-other-irregularitieswithin-this-province/. An Act to Prevent firing of guns and other firearms within this state, on
certain days therein mentioned, 1785, 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 152 (1886).
54. See generally Saul Cornell, History, Text, Tradition, and the Future of Second Amendment
Jurisprudence: Limits on Armed Travel under Anglo-American Law, 1688 1868, 83 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (2020).
55. See generally Chris R. Kyle, Monarch and Marketplace: Proclamations as News in Early
Modern England 78 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 771 (2015).
56. See Frassetto, supra note 49.
57. E. Lee Shepard, This Being Court Day : Courthouses and Community Life in Rural
Virginia, 103 THE VIRGINIA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 459, 466 (1995); Rhys
Isaac, Dramatizing the Ideology of Revolution: Popular Mobilization in Virginia, 1774 to 1776?
33 THE WM. & MARY Q. 357, 383 (1976).
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to carry on muster days. Similarly, the fact that Thomas Jefferson asked a
friend to return a pair of pistols that he mistakenly left locked securely in a
case at a tavern he vis
that the Founders promiscuously and habitually carried arms in public. Here
58

Again, the

owned firearms and used them for a variety of purposes is incorrectly taken
as evidence of a broad free-standing right to carry guns in public whenever
and wherever an individual traveled. If Clement had quoted the entire
relevant section of the latter, not just a snippet out of context, the evidence
your house, the morning after I lodged

59

or Mr. Eppes to call on you for it, as they come on to Congress, to either of
60
The first point worth noting
is that Jefferson traveled with his pistols in a locked case. Having accidently
left them at an inn, a fact that underscores that the pistols were far from his
convenience, a fact that further suggests that Jefferson did not believe that
the pistols were essential to his day-to-day life.61 Rather than demonstrate
that Jefferson was an ardent supporter of unfettered public carry, the full
quote shows that Jefferson typically carried weapons locked up when he
traveled on the public roads of the new nation. Indeed, Jefferson was so
mindful of this need, he had a special pair of pistol holders made that would
allow him to carry his arms securely locked when he ventured beyond his
vast land holdings in the western part of Virginia.62
Although Clement makes much of the guns owned by the Founders, he
is dismissive of the law books they owned and the treatment of limits on
armed travel that were well established features of the common law.
Clement is particularly disdainful of references in amicus briefs to the work
Country Justice, a popular legal text that was among the
most influential legal books published in the eighteenth-century Anglo58. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass n v. Bruen, (2021) (No.
20-843).
59. THOMAS
JEFFERSON
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
Firearms ,
https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/firearms.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The research division at Monticello have collected many of Jefferson s comments about
firearms. See THOMAS JEFFERSON ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59. Contrary to claims of Clement
and the Professors of Second Amendment Law Brief, Jefferson securely locked up his guns when
traveling in public, going so far as to commission a custom saddle to lock them up.
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s

All such as shall go or ride armed (offensively) in Fairs, Markets
or elsewhere; or shall wear, or carry any Guns, Dags, or Pistols
charged, any Constable; seeing this may arrest them, carry them
before a Justice of the Peace, and he may bind them to the Peace;
defense upon any private quarrel.

the Peace against the other persons: and besides, it striketh a fear and Terror
64

during the Founding Era the act of
trav
there was no need to independently establish a specific intent to
terrify, or prove that an action was an actual breach of the peace to meet this
terror requirement.65 Nor did English law accept that one might preemptively arm to address a specified threat, the appropriate response was to
bind the threatening person to the peace.
riate
response was still to arrest them, and bind the threatening person to the peace.
Moreover, if the person continued to arm in contravention of the prohibition
66

Dalton also noted that the law included an exemption for cases in which
individuals acted to preserve the peace.67 It would have made little sense for
Dalton to underscore this exception in his guide to the law if there was a
general right of armed peaceable travel. As he noted, only
Servants in his presence, and Sheriffs, and their Officers, and other the Kings
Ministers, and such as be in their company assisting them in executing the
Kings Process, or otherwise in executing of their Office, and all others in

63. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 58, at 7 8.
64. See MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 380 (1726).
65. Id. On Dalton s influence and the role of justice of the peace guides to Anglo-American
legal culture, see Larry M. Boyer, The Justice of the Peace in England and America from 1506 to
1776: A Bibliographic History, 34 THE Q. J. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 315 (1977).
66. DALTON, supra note 64, at 380.
67. Id. at 381.
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68

important legal texts imported to the colonies, and any jurist who purports
John Adams not only owned a copy
ent of the common
law in his preparation for the Boston Massacre trial. Adams evidently
considered Dalton to be authoritative, as important as other influential
English legal commentators he considered, including Coke, Blackstone, and
Hawkins (some of whom cited Dalton in their own treatises).69 Adams noted
that the use of arms to put down riots was not simply legal, but subjects were
required to assist agents of the crown to restore the peace.70 The use of arms
in these contexts was the limited exception to the general rule against public
carry. But Clement takes a very narrow exception to the rule and treats it as
dispositive, ignoring the rule itself.
were incredibly influential at the time that the Second
Amendment was ratified, and their significance outlasted the Founding era.
work continued to be quoted in antebellum American legal texts,
including the growing genre of state-specific justice of the peace manuals
that proliferated in the early republic.71
including his position that there existed no general right to carry firearms in
public, even for anticipated self-defense thus contributed to the general
understanding of governmental authority to regulate public carry when the
Second Amendment was drafted, as well as when the Fourteenth
Amendment made it applicable to the States.

III. Regionalism and Change Over Time: Treating the Right of
Self Defense and Regulation Historically
No scholar familiar with early American legal history would presume
to generalize American legal attitudes based on the views of slave-owning
judges in the Antebellum era, yet much of the case against New York rests

68. Adams quoted Dalton, Blackstone, and Hawkins, three of the most influential texts in the
colonies. And so perhaps the killing of dangerous rioters, may be justified by any private persons,
who cannot otherwise suppress them, or defend themselves from them; in as much as every private
person seems to be authorized by the law, to arm himself for the purposes aforesaid.
Hawkins, PLEAS OF THE CROWN p. 71.
69. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 58, at 10 11; Adams Argument for the Defense:
3 4
December
1770, Founders
Online, NAT L
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/05-03-02-0001-0004-0016.
70. NAT L ARCHIVES, supra note 69.
71. William Henig, one of the most influential legal figures in early Virginia history, quoted
extensively from The Country Justice in his discussion of surety of the peace and copied the
standard form of a surety from Dalton; see WILLIAM HENIG, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 572 79
(Johnson & Warner, 2nd ed. 1810).
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on generalizations derived from the views of this body of sources.72 There
is little doubt that a more expansive conception of gun rights emerged in
parts of the slave-owning South. 73 But, it is equally indisputable that a
different model of firearms regulation emerged in Massachusetts and spread
to other parts of the nation, and eventually to some parts of the slave-owning
South.74 The Massachusetts Model used sureties of the peace and good
behavior to enforce the peace.75 However, Clement and the other amicus
briefs supporting his position misrepresent the nature of sureties,
transforming them from a means to limit armed travel and preserve the peace
into something resembling a modern shall-issue regulatory framework.76
The erroneous claim that surety of the peace laws allowed individuals to
carry arms, unless a specific individual came forward to demand a peace
bond, turns Founding-era history on its head. The purpose of these laws
was in fact to achieve the opposite goal: limiting armed travel in public to a
very narrow range of situations.77
Gun rights advocates have approached Anglo-American law as if little
changed between the Glorious Revolution and the American Civil War.78
But a proper understanding of the evolving meaning of self-defense and
the changing legal response to the potential threat posed by the emergence
of cheap, reliable, and easily concealed weapons is essential to making
sense of the legal history of this period.
The common law model of conserving the peace inherited from
England was rooted in the face-to-face communal practices of early modern
79
Until the rise of modern police forces in the
nineteenth century, this community-based model of policing dominated on

72. On the importance of early American regional differences in the evolution of the common
law, see generally David Konig, Regionalism in Early American Law, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 144 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., Cambridge
University Press, 1st ed. 2008); Lauren Benton & Kathryn Walker, Law for the Empire: The
Common Law in Colonial America and the Problem of Legal Diversity, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937
(2014).
73. Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern
Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 Y ALE L. J.F. 121 (2015).
74. Id.
75. On the Massachusetts Model, see Blocher & Miller, supra note 19, at 30.
76. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 58, at 11 12.
77. DALTON, supra note 64, at 380 ( [I]f he hath broken (or forfeited) his Recognizance by
Breach of the Peace, the Justice may and ought to bind him anew, and by better Sureties, for the
Safety of the Person in Danger . . . . ).
78. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97,
101 (2009) (erroneously reading developments in the antebellum South backward into earlier
English and American history.)
79. See generally STEVE HINDLE, THE STATE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 1550 1640 (Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed. 2000).
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both sides of the Atlantic.80 As conservators of the peace, justices of the
peace, sheriffs, and constables maintained their traditional authority to
enforce the peace. This included the power to preemptively disarm, bind
over with sureties of the peace or good behavior, and imprison those who
violated the prohibition on armed travel.81
The importance of this tradition was underscored in the Massachusetts
case of Commonwealth v. Leach.82 The case addressed the question of how
much of the traditional power accorded to justices of the peace under
common law had been absorbed into Massachusetts law. Contrary to
Leach case affirmed that the English statutes enacted
during the reign of Edward III, bestowing extensive powers on justices of
the peace,
. This
included the wide-ranging authority to detain, disarm, and bind to the peace
any individual who traveled armed in public outside of the recognized
exemptions.83
Massachusetts law expanded gun rights well beyond the traditional
English common law view, but it stopped short of the modern libertarian
vision being championed in Bruen. The approach taken by Massachusetts in
this effort to rationalize their law was built on the landmark decision on the
scope of legal self-defense: Commonwealth v. Selfridge, an 1806 case that
changed the course of American criminal law and its view of armed selfdefense.84 By failing to understand the role of Selfridge in the history of the
evolution of American self-defense law, gun rights advocates and their
scholarly allies have warped early American criminal law almost beyond

80. LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 100 (The University of
North Carolina Press, ed. 2009). For examples of unreliable historical accounts of sureties and
the role of the justice of the peace as conservators of the peace, see David B. Kopel and George A.
Mocsary, Errors of Omission: Words Missing from the Ninth Circuit s Young v. State of Hawaii.
For another ahistorical treatment of the same issue, see Robert Leider, Constitutional Liquidation,
Surety Laws, and the Right to Bear Arms, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LEGAL STUDIES
RESEARCH
PAPER
SERIES
NO.
LS
21-06,
1,
13
(2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3697761. Leider weaponized this argument
in his amicus brief in Bruen, repeating the same errors, see Leider, supra note 10.
81. Cornell, supra note 54, at 79, 83, 90.
82. EPHRAIM WILLIAMS ET AL., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 31 (Palala Press ed.,
2015).
83. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 58, at 6 7.
84. Retreat, not stand your ground, was the legal requirement under English common law.
The notable exception to this rule was the castle doctrine covering deadly force in the home
against intruders. See Semayne s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1604) (KB). See generally, Darrell
A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2017).
On Selfridge s importance to the American law of self-defense, see RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN,
NO DUTY TO RETREAT VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY (1991).
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recognition, and therefore failed to grasp the significance of the
Massachusetts Model.85
Under English common law, there was no good cause or imminent
threat exception that allowed individuals to pre-emptively carry arms to
defend against a specified threat. The Massachusetts model built on
86
Selfridge
According to the Selfridge
standard, if an individual had a reasonable fear of serious injury or death,
with a specified threat, arming pre-emptively was now legal.87 This new
approach to arming in cases of specified need was an important break with
English law, but it was not a total rejection of the entire common law
approach to limiting armed travel.
It would be hard to over-state the significance of Selfridge to American
law. Selfridge recognized that the traditional communal enforcement of the
peace that shaped English law was itself insufficient in the changed
circumstances of the early American republic. The world of the Founders
had been replaced by the one chronicled by Tocqueville in Democracy in
America.88 The evolving right of self-defense as articulated in Selfridge
reflected the growth of a new, more individualistic conception of armed selfdefense an approach that recognized the need to arm in situations in which
an individual could not depend on neighbors or the law for protection.89
The new, post-Selfridge standard was codified in two distinct
provisions of the criminal code adopted by Massachusetts in the 1830s. The
first provision reaffirmed the right of any person to seek a peace bond against
any individual who threatened the peace:
rmed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol,
or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable
cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person,
or to his family or property, he may on complaint of any person
having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace,
90

85. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 58, at 8 9.
86. The impact of Selfridge on criminal reform in Massachusetts is evident IN REPORT OF
THE PENAL CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS 22, (1844).
87. On the significance of Selfridge, see Francis Wharton, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (1846) at 259.
88. George Kateb, Democratic Individualism and Its Critics, 6 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 275,
293 (2003).
89. Daniel Breen, Parson s Charge: The Strange Origins of Stand Your Ground, 16 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 71 (2017).
90. 1836 Mass. Acts 750.
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Massachusetts also expressly reaffirmed the broad powers of justice of
the peace to maintain the peace even in cases in which no individual brought
forward a complaint, providing that:
fine, not exceeding ten dollars, all assaults and batteries, and
other breaches of the peace, when the offence is not of a high and
aggravated nature, and cause to be stayed and arrested all
affrayers, rioters, disturbers and breakers of the peace, and all
who go armed offensively, to the terror of the people, and such
as utter menaces or threatening speeches, or are otherwise
91

Under Massachusetts law, any justice of the peace thus retained the
authority that conservators of the peace had enjoyed under English common
law, to arrest or bind over citizens violating the statue prohibiting armed
travel.
In his reply brief on behal
law in NYSRPA v. Bruen, Paul Clement falsely claimed that the
required a magistrate to find reasonable caus
that someone had demonstrated a propensity to misuse a firearm to cause
injury, or breach the peac before a surety could be demanded to continue
carrying it 92 Paul Clement was, as usual, wrong about the history. In fact,
the reasonable cause standard applied to the narrow exception permitting
public carry, not to the general rule prohibiting it.93
that [t]hese laws thus reinforced the understanding that the people had a
baseline right to carry arms, and that only abuse of that right could justify its
restricti
se laws actually worked as the
relevant statutes make clear.94
One of the best sources to illuminate the public understanding of the
19th-century Massachusetts law is a commentary authored by one of the
leading criminal law judges, Peter Oxenbridge Thacher.95 A standard
legal maxim familiar to judges and lawyers in antebellum America held that

91. 1836 Mass. Acts.
92. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 58, at 11.
93. 1836 Mass. Acts, Chap. 85 Sect. 25.
94. Clement offers no historical evidence to substantiate his reading of how surety statutes
were interpreted at the time by leading Massachusetts jurists.
95. The dominant model of originalism, public meaning originalism, focuses on the how an
ideal legally knowledgeable reader at the time would have understood the words of the text, for a
useful guide to originalist theory, see Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013).
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construction that sages of the law, who li

Few figures

Oxenbridge Thacher.97
Thacher explicated the meaning of the Massachusetts law in an
influential grand jury charge that was reprinted as a pamphlet and also
excerpted in the press. Grand jury charges were important civic occasion in
antebellum America, and were especially significant public events in
expound and explicate the meaning of important legal concepts to citizens.
Thacher reminded members of the grand jury,
on
may go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an assault or
98

dismissed their relevance.99 According to this flawed gun rights account,
with little legal significance. In

96. Coke s legal maxim regarding the importance of consulting the sages of the law when
interpreting statutes was familiar to lawyers and judges in the early Republic, see E. FITCH SMITH,
COMMENTARIES ON STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS 739 (Gould, Banks & Gould, ed. 1848). On
Smith s significance to antebellum legal culture, see POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY
AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 69; see also Leider, supra note 80.
97. Thacher was praised by contemporaries for his thorough knowledge of the criminal law
and its practical application, P.O WOODMAN, REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CASES TRIED IN THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, BEFORE PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, JUDGE OF
THAT COURT FOR 1823-1843 (Boston, 1845). The American Review, an influential Whig magazine,
singled out this volume with effusive praise, commenting that the judge s high character as a
magistrate was not only known to the profession in New England, but his published charges to
grand juries, and occasional reports of important cases tried before him, had made him known
throughout the country. See 3 THE AMERICAN REVIEW: A WHIG JOURNAL OF POLITICS,
LITERATURE, ART, AND SCIENCE 222 23 (1846).
98. Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF
SUFFOLK FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF TERMS OF THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON ON MONDAY, DEC. 5TH A.D. 1836 AND ON MONDAY,
MARCH 13TH, A.D. 27-28 (Dutton and Wentworth eds., 1837); Judge Thacher s Charges,
CHRISTIAN REGISTER AND BOSTON OBSERVER June 10, 1837, p. 91.
99. For strained efforts by gun rights advocates to discredit Thacher s understanding of his
state s criminal law, see FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS,
AND POLICY 79 80 (Nicholas J. Johnson et al. eds., 2018); see also Leider, supra note 80. On the
role of grand jury charges in this period of American legal history, see DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN
AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 93 98 (2016); Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court
and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1754 (2003). The phrase sages of
the law was frequently used by legal commentators from Coke to Kent, see e.g., James Kent, 1
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 463 (1826). On Coke s instantiation of the concept in AngloAmerican law, see Wilfrid Prest, History and Biography, Legal and Otherwise, 32 ADEL. L. REV.
185 (2011).
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reality though, grand jury charges were important civic occasions in part
because leading jurists expounded the meaning of the law for the public.
Thus, if one were genuinely interested in how the Massachusetts law was
understood by the public at that time (and certainly by those well-informed
readers acquainted with modes of legal reasoning and canons of statutory
construction)
source that would illuminate the original public meaning of the
Massachusetts laws on public carry.100
and counsel to the public was unequivocal: No civilian had the right to go
violence to his person, family, or property.

101

IV. Armed Travel in Antebellum Boston: Testing the nonEnforcement Thesis
Gun rights advocates have not only ignored or dismissed the express
statements of antebellum criminal jurists about limits on armed travel in
antebellum Massachusetts, but they have also concocted an alternative
theory of a right to peaceable armed travel based on a wholly speculative and
implausible set of claims derived not from any actual sources, but from
silences in the historical record.102 According to this deeply-flawed view,
carrying guns in public was the contemporary norm simply because scholars
(half of whom do not seem to be looking particularly hard in the right places)
have not yet found any cases challenging the Massachusetts law. This nonenforcement thesis rests on a host of interpretive errors. It misreads the
silences in the historical record, ignores readily available evidence from
cities like Boston
enforced, effectively jumbles the historical chronology of gun regulation in
the state ignoring important changes in the law over time, and fails to
understand how criminal justice and law enforcement functioned in the early
republic.103
First, it is important to acknowledge that written records of the activities
of local justices of the peace from centuries ago, are hard to locate,
particularly in rural areas of New England, if they survive at all. Although
100. There is a vast and seemingly ever-expanding scholarly literature on originalism, for a
useful introduction see generally, Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013).
101. Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF
SUFFOLK FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF TERMS OF THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON ON MONDAY, DEC. 5TH A.D. 1836 AND ON MONDAY,
MARCH 13TH, A.D. 27-28 (Dutton and Wentworth, 1837); Judge Thacher s Charges, CHRISTIAN
REGISTER AND BOSTON OBSERVER June 10, 1837, 91.
102. Leider, supra note 80.
103. Leider, supra note 80.
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the records of justices of the peace in rural New England are rare, there is
ample historical
, that
shows armed travel in public was an unusual event, but nonetheless was a
crime that was enforced by the Boston police and courts. The rules and
ordinances governing the Boston police expressly empowered police officers
to arrest any person who traveled armed in violation of state law. Such
individuals could be stopped and searched, and if weapons were found, could
be prosecuted. The rules governing Boston police were explicit about this
power: police had the power to stop and search any individual who disturbed
104
The gloss on
the law in the Boston police rules makes it clear that a good cause like that
required by the modern New York law was the only reason that would
justify armed travel under early Massachusetts law.
The most obvious explanation for why there were no challenges to the
Massachusetts prohibition on armed carry is that few individuals at that time
traveled armed in heavily-populated areas in the state without a good cause.
Historian Roger Lane, the leading authority on crime in nineteenth-century
criminals in fact carried arms, even after the invention of the revolver made
105
This conclusion is consistent with
the fact that Boston police did not themselves routinely carry firearms until
decades after the Civil War period: the standard weapon issued to police in
the antebellum era was a club, not a firearm. Not only did the typical Boston
policeman not carry a firearm, but the entire police force owned only a
handful of revolvers. Property inventories of the Boston police are
illuminating in this regard: the list of moveable property owned by the
Boston police for the year 1862 shows a total of 270 clubs and only 7
revolvers. If Bostonians were promiscuously traveling armed and gun toting
posed a serious threat to public safety, it seems highly unlikely that the entire
Boston police would have owned a total of just seven revolvers at the start
of the Civil War era.106
Arrest statistics compiled by Boston
undermine the non-enforcement thesis. As the data in Table One shows,
only a tiny fraction of assaults in the city involved a weapon of any kind.
Moreover, the number of arrests for unlawfully carrying weapons in public
were also miniscule. Contrary to the claims of modern gun rights advocates,
the evidence from Boston does not support the non-enforcement thesis, but
rather suggests
on
104. A SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAW AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF BOSTON 91 (1866).
105. Roger LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822-1885 103 04 (Harvard University Press
ed., 1967).
106. ANNUAL REPORT OF CHIEF OF POLICE 1862 CITY DOCUMENT NO. 3 13 (Boston, 1863).
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armed travel, and few individuals carried weapons in public in the period
leading up to the Civil War. In short, Bostonians, in contrast to their southern
brethren, simply did not habitually arm themselves.107
Boston Police Enforcement Data 1864 and 1866108

Year
1864
1866

Assault and Assault With Disturbing the Carrying
Battery
Weapons
Peace
Weapons
Unlawfully
1016
100
309
8
1091
78
666
5

When the commentaries by leading jurists from Massachusetts, most
notably Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, are considered alongside the data about
policing practices in Boston, the absence of pistols in the inventory of the
Boston police department, and the decision to continue to arm officers with
clubs, not firearms, the gun rights
non-enforcement thesis
collapses under the weight of countervailing evidence.

V. The Modern Paradigm of Gun Control Emerges:
Reconstruction and the Right to Regulate Firearms
In a remarkable colloquy between Clement and Justice Thomas during
the oral arguments in Bruen, the two discussed the relevance of
Reconstruction-era practices to understanding the scope of permissible
modern regulation.109 Reconstruction, the contentious period after the Civil
War, is generally acknowledged by originalist judges and scholars to be the
pe
protections apply to state laws.110 This was a violent period in American
history, one where the nation responded to newly-rising levels of gun
violence by enacting tough laws.111 During Reconstruction, states not only
rewrote their constitutional provisions on arms bearing to expressly permit
107. On the different patterns of gun violence in the North and the South in the pre-Civil War
era, see RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 180 249 (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2009).
108. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE 1864, CITY DOCUMENT NO. 6 8 9 (Boston,
1865); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE 1866, CITY DOCUMENT NO. 9 9 10 (Boston,
1867).
109. Transcript of oral argument, supra note 12, at 6 9.
110. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011); Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d
765, 824 (9th Cir. 2021).
111. Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and Gun Regulation
in the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL Y REV. 615, 621 22 (2006); Mark Anthony
Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 95, 113 17 (2016).
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the regulation of public carry, but states and localities passed dozens of new
laws regulating nearly every aspect of firearms ownership and use. These
laws were aggressively enforced and applied to all without regard to race
until the era of Jim Crow, when these facially neutral laws were used as tools
of racial oppression.112

Figure 1 - Post-Civil War Local Public Carry Laws (data from Appendix, Table 2)

Yet, despite having conceded that the evidence from Reconstruction
was dispositive, Clement simply dismisses the extensive regulations enacted
during this period as little more than a scattering of laws.113 In fact, as Figure
1 shows, dozens of laws were enacted across the country, and millions of
Americans were living under these regulations, including half the population
114
of California and all of
Even
more germane to the facts before the Court, many localities adopted good
cause permit laws precisely the type of regulations that are at issue in
NYSRPA v. Bruen.115 Indeed in many states, the majority of citizens were
living under such laws.116
earlier laws, which emerged during Reconstruction.117
As Table 2 shows, most
type of restriction on public carry in place by last decade of the nineteenth
112. Brennan Rivas, Enforcement of Public Carry Restrictions: Texas as a Case Study, U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
113. Transcript of oral argument, supra note 12, at 6 9.
114. See Appendix, Table 2.
115. Dozens of cities enacted permit schemes, see Charles, supra note 23. See Appendix, Table
2.
116. See Appendix, Table 1.
117. See Appendix, Table 2.
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century. The example of California is particularly instructive in this regard.
ing under a permit scheme or
some other restrictive public carry regime as the new century dawned.118 Nor
was California unique in this regard. As Table 2 shows, dozens of similar
statutes were passed in the post-Civil War era. These regulations included
permit schemes, bans on concealed carry, or total prohibitions on armed
carry in public.119 Given that research on gun regulation, particularly during
Reconstruction is still ongoing, it is likely that this list will continue to grow
as new research reveals previously hidden sources. These restrictions on
public carry governed the lives of millions of Americans who were living
under some type of regulatory regime that limited public carry in a manner
similar to the New York law at issue in Bruen. The idea that permissive open
carry was the legal norm in post-Civil War America is a gun rights fantasy
and has no foundation in history. Under any serious and credible form of
the Heller/McDonald history, text, tradition mode of analysis.
Not only were these laws common in post-Civil War America, but they
were generally understood to be consistent with the Second Amendment.
Multiple legal commentators, from the distinguished jurist John Norton
Pomeroy to the multi-volume and authoritative Encyclopedia of English and
American Law all agreed that armed travel in public could be limited,
provided a good cause exception was available for those who faced a
specified need for self-defense.
120

The most important change in American law in the post-Civil War era
was not the adoption of permissive carry which had always been a southern
phenomenon. Rather, the most significant transformation was the move
from the common law model and its use of an affirmative defense at trial to
vindicate a self-defense claim for traveling armed, towards permit-based
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES: ESPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR STUDENTS, GENERAL AND PROFESSIONAL 152 53
(University of California Libraries, 1868).
3 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 408 (John Houston Merrill ed., 1887). This influential survey of law
was an essential reference for lawyers. See 2 9 AMERICA AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW,
42 CENT. L. J. 397, 400 (1896) (book review). In his oral argument Clement claimed that any
evidence from beyond the 1870s was not probative because some courts had adopted a militiabased reading of the Second Amendment precluded by Heller. The only jurisdiction where such a
claim might be plausible was Kansas where courts did adopt an approach to the Second Amendment
that derived from antebellum southern cases Heller dismissed as early as 1905. Transcript of oral
argument, supra note 12, at 7. The key Kansas case was City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan.
ws from the early 20th century ought to be excluded.
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schemes. Under such schemes, those wishing to travel armed could present
evidence of a specified threat to obtain a permit to carry a weapon, which
was typically concealed and not carried openly.121 The use of affirmative
defense was consistent with the traditional common law surety model that
emerged in the context of a pre-industrial society in which most law
enforcement was community-based. Over the course of the nineteenth
century, as America modernized and urbanized, professional police forces,
police courts, and administrative agencies took over the job of maintaining
public order from justice of the peace. The new permit-based scheme
emerged in the context of these larger changes in criminal justice.122

VI. Conclusion
Bruen offers
them an opportunity to demonstrate that this method can be applied
rigorously and neutrally. Doing so means distinguishing between invented
historical traditions and real history. It remains to be seen if they will follow
the history or an invented historical tradition more in line with the political
preferences of the modern Republican party. The stakes in this case could
not be higher. The Supreme Court will not only decide the framework for
evaluating the constitutionality of future gun laws, but the credibility of the
Court is itself at stake. Much of the recent criticism of the Court has focused
on its increasingly politicization. A decision along partisan lines striking
legitimacy and intellectual prestige. If members of the Court care about their
-advised to avoid a decision that
exemplifies law office history at its worst.

121. Id.
122. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, AMERICA BECOMES URBAN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.
CITIES & TOWNS, 1780-1980 98 108 (University of California Press, 1st ed. 1988).
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APPENDIX
Table 1 - Post-Civil War State Constitutional Arms Bearing
Provisions and Regulation
Date State
1868 Georgia

1869

Texas

1870

Tennessee

1875

Missouri

1875

North
Carolina

Provision
Ga. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 14: The
right of the people to bear arms in
defense of themselves and the lawful
authority of the State, shall not be
infringed, but the Legislature may
prescribe the manner in which they
may be borne.
Tex. Const. of 1869, art. I § 13: Every
person shall have the right to keep and
bear arms, in the lawful defense of
himself or the State, under such
regulations as the Legislature may
prescribe.
Tenn. Const. of 1870, art. I, § 26:
That the citizens of this State have a
right to keep and to bear arms for
their common defense; but the
Legislature shall have power, by law,
to regulate the wearing of arms with a
view to prevent crime.
Mo. Const of 1875, art. II, § 17: Right
to bear arms, when That the right of
no citizen to keep and bear arms in
defense of his home, person and
property, or in aid of the civil power,
when hereto legally summoned, shall
be called in question; but nothing
herein contained is intended to justify
the practice of wearing concealed
weapons.

Population
1,184,109

N.C. Const. of 1875, Art. I, § 30. A
well regulated militia being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed; and as standing

1,399,750

818,579

1,258,520

2,168,380

June 2022

HISTORY AND TRADITION OR FANTASY AND F ICTION

173

armies in time of peace, are dangerous
to liberty, they ought not to be kept
up, and the military should be kept
under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power.
Nothing herein contained shall justify
the practice of carrying concealed
weapon, or prevent the legislature
from enacting penal statutes against
said practice.
1876

Colorado

1879

Louisiana

1885

Florida

1889

Idaho

1889

Montana

Colo. Const. of 1876, art. II, § 13:
That the right of no person to keep
and bear arms in defense of his home,
person and property, or in aid of the
civil power when hereto legally
summoned shall be called in question;
but nothing herein contained shall be
construed to justify the practice of
carrying concealed weapons.
La. Const. of 1879, art. III: A well
regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be abridged. This shall not
prevent the passage of laws to punish
those who carry weapons concealed.
Fla. Const. of 1885, art. I, § 20: The
right of the people to bear arms in
defense of themselves and the lawful
authority of the State, shall not be
infringed, but the Legislature may
prescribe the manner in which they
may be borne.
Idaho Const. of 1889, art. I, § 11: The
people have the right to bear arms for
their security and defense; but the
legislature shall regulate the exercise
of this right by law.
Mont. Const. of 1889, art. III, § 13:
The right of any person to keep or
bear arms in defense of his own
home, person, and property, or in aid

194,327

939,946

391,422

88,548

142,942
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1896

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

of the civil power when thereto
legally summoned, shall not be called
in question, but nothing herein
contained shall be held to permit the
carrying of concealed weapons.
Mississippi Miss. Const. of 1890, art. III, § 12:
The right of every citizen to keep and
bear arms in defense of his home,
person or property, or in aid of the
civil power when thereto legally
summoned, shall not be called in
question, but the legislature may
regulate or forbid carrying concealed
weapons.
Kentucky
Ky. Constitution of 1891, § 1.7: The
right to bear arms in defense of
themselves and of the State, subject to
the power of the General Assembly to
enact laws to prevent persons from
carrying concealed weapons.
Utah
Utah Const of 1896, art. I, § 6: the
people have the right to bear arms for
their security and defense, but the
legislature may regulate the exercise
of this right by law.
Total:
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1,289,600

1,858,635

276,749

12,011,507
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Table 2 - Post-Civil War Local Public Carry Laws
Year

State

City / County

Population
Covered

Population
Total Per
State
26,098

~1885
~1888
~1903
1873
1889

Tuscaloosa
Montgomery
Skagway
Tucson
N/A

4,215
21,883
~9,400
3,224
88,243

1865
1876
1878
1880
1881
1882
1882
1884
1884
1885
1888
1889
1890
1892
1914
1904
~1914

Alabama
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arizona (Entire
State)
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
Colorado
Colorado

5,728
21,420
319
7,143
5,864
16,464
872
233,959
1,339
10,818
1,015
3,991
48,682
1,662
3,067
305
29,078

340,923

1886
1901
1902
1906
1905
1910
1880
1893
~1912
1870
1877
1879

Connecticut
Connecticut
Connecticut
Connecticut
Idaho
Idaho
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas

Los Angeles
Sacramento
Eureka
Napa
Santa Barbara
Alameda
San Jose
San Francisco
St. Helena
Fresno
Lompoc
Marysville
Oakland
Monterey
Needles
Windsor
Colorado
Springs
New Haven
Naugatuck
Waterbury
Hartford
Twin Falls
Caldwell
Nashville
Evanston
Hinsdale
Abilene
Empire City
Arkansas City

81,298
10,541
45,859
98,915
13,543
3,624
2,222
19,259
2,451
2,360
Unavailable
8,847

236,613

~9,400
88,243

29,383

17,086
23,932
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1879
1882
1883
1884
1887
1888
1888
1888
1888
1888
1890
1890
1891
1893
1876
1909
1894
1906
1889
1870
1882
1882
1888
1912
1881
~1881
1890
1883
1893
~1906
1909
1880
~1872
1895
1905
1897
~1885
1887
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Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
(Entire State)
Massachusetts
(Entire State)
Michigan
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Missouri
Missouri
Missouri
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New Mexico
(Entire State)
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Beloit
Argentine
Burlington
Delphos
Lakin
Concordia
Holton
Johnston City
Fredonia
Wichita
Coffeyville
Coming
Halstead
Scandia
Frankfort
Portland
N/A

1,835
4,732
2,011
4,516
258
3,401
3,082
143
1,515
23,853
4,953
425
1,071
598
6,958
58,571
1,042,800

N/A

3,365,000

3,365,000

St. Joseph
Hastings
St. Paul
Worthington
New Ulm
Virginia
Greenville
St. Louis
Columbia
Helena
Red Lodge
Anaconda
Harlowton
Falls City
Omaha
Lincoln
Reno
Montclair
Albuquerque
N/A

3,733
3,458
41,473
636
3,741
10,473
1,051
350,518
4,000
3,624
624
12,988
770
1,583
16,083
40,169
10,867
13,962
3,785
160,282

3,733
59,781

63,600

6,958
58,571
1,042,800

355,569

18,006

57,835

10,867
13,962
160,282
(population
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~1877
1880
1881
1891
1892
1905
1909
1910
1888
1871
1893
1894
1893
1902
1879
~1871
1873
1897
1870
1871
~1877
1888
1895
1897
1878
1895
1905
1871
1881
~1887
1890
~1896
~1917
1875
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New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
Oregon
Tennessee
Tennessee
Tennessee
Texas (Entire
State)
Texas (Entire
State)
Utah
Utah
Vermont
Vermont
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington
D.C.
West Virginia
West Virginia
(Entire State)
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wyoming
(Entire State)

177

adjusted)
3,051,880

Syracuse
Brooklyn
New York
Buffalo
Elmira
Troy
Lockport
Albany
Bottineau
Newark
Massillon
Columbus
Enid
Okeene
Astoria
Lebanon
Nashville
Centennial
N/A

51,792
599,495
1,919,000
255,664
30,893
76,813
17,970
100,253
145
6,698
10,092
88,150
3,444
Unavailable
3,981
2,073
25,865
Unavailable
818,579

N/A

818,579

Provo
Salt Lake City
Barre
St. Albans
Walla Walla
Spokane
Tacoma
N/A

3,432
44,843
8,448
6,239
8,716
86,848
83,743
131,700

48,275

Wheeling
N/A

30,737
702,794

733,531

Berlin
Milwaukee
Madison
N/A

4,149
285,315
38,378
20,789

327,842

Total:

11,567,347

145
104,940

3,444
3,981
27,938

818,579
(population
adjusted)

14,687
179,307

131,700

20,789

